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Is Copyright Property? 
ADAM MOSSOFF* 
In his article, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of 
Copyright Law,1 Richard Epstein offers a Lockean justification for 
intellectual property rights generally, and copyright specifically.  
Epstein’s thesis is profoundly important and basic: All legal property 
rights, whether tangible or intangible, are born of important policy 
considerations.  In proving this, he surveys the justification and 
development of property rights in the West, and reveals with great 
clarity that many of the traditional (and tread-worn) policy issues 
concerning the definition of tangible property rights are eerily similar to 
the issues implicated in the now-raging debate concerning the definition 
of intellectual property rights, especially copyright in digital content. 
Alas, Epstein’s insight may fall on deaf ears.  For the peer-to-peer 
(P2P) file swappers and their advocates in think tanks and academia, the 
problem with Epstein’s thesis is reflected in the terms of his title: Liberty 
versus Property.  For these people, the Internet’s unique or exceptional 
characteristics—whether in its end-to-end (E2E) infrastructure or in its 
transaction-cost-lowering effects—changes the fundamental policy 
equation.2  Accordingly, these “Internet exceptionalists”3 have come to 
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 1. 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 2. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 23–48 (2001) (discussing the 




view the debate in terms of only one side of this juxtaposition—liberty.4  
In their minds, “digital copyright,” and “intellectual property” generally, 
is an oxymoron.5  The digital realm is about freedom—in every respect, 
from its architecture, to its ethos, to its implications for politics6 (as 
Californians discovered with a successful recall election in September 
2003 spawned by websites providing information on signing and 
collecting petitions for the recall campaign7).  They maintain that the 
architecture of the Internet, its E2E nature, and noting some of the regulatory 
implications of this structural design); John Peter Barlow, Cyberspace Declaration of 
Independence (Feb. 8, 1996), at http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html 
(declaring that, on the Internet, “whatever the human mind may create can be reproduced 
and distributed infinitely at no cost”). 
 3. This is a protean term that does not have a precise definition.  It covers a wide 
variety of positions, including individuals advocating for (1) the abolition of intellectual 
property rights in digital content, see, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, 
WIRED (March 1993), and (2) the rolling back of intellectual property rights generally 
given what we have learned about the nature of innovative work in our new digital 
world, see, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, On My Bad Grades in Software: An Appeal, at 
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/cooper.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (proposing 
a ten-year copyright term for software code).  Given his advocacy rhetoric, see infra note 
26 and accompanying text, Lessig is sometimes thought to support position (1), but he 
ardently maintains that he is in favor of some intellectual property rights in digital 
content—within the “balancing” framework that he proposes as the policy foundation for 
these rights.  See infra note 30 and accompanying text.  Further complicating efforts at 
defining Internet exceptionalism, the digital world continues to evolve in unforeseen 
ways (who could have predicted the rise of the blog in 2003 and 2004 to such social and 
political prominence), and thus the views of the various players continue to morph 
accordingly.  As used in this Essay, therefore, this term is limited to the positions 
described herein. 
 4. Barlow, supra note 2 (declaring that the denizens of the Internet “must declare 
our virtual selves immune to [state] sovereignty” and that “[w]e will spread ourselves 
across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts”). 
 5. Dan Gillmor, a somewhat obstreperous activist in favor of Internet 
exceptionalism, has remarked: 
   The copyright industry talks about “intellectual property”—a grossly 
misleading expression that turns history and logic upside down. 
   Property, by tradition and law, is physical.  The idea of “intellectual 
property” is a fairly recent invention by the people who believe they should be 
able to own ideas, and totally control their use, with the help of a compliant 
Congress. 
Dan Gillmor, We Must Engage the Copyright Debate, at http://www.siliconvalley.com/ 
mld/siliconvalley/3842508.htm (Aug. 11, 2002).  But see infra note 38 (discussing factual 
inaccuracy of Gillmor’s criticism). 
 6. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Internet Under Siege, FOREIGN POLICY 
(Nov.–Dec. 2001), at 56 (discussing how the architecture and ethos of the Internet 
provide a unique opportunity for promoting creativity and political liberty). 
 7. In a spring 2003 article on Governor Gray Davis’s declining popularity, the 
New York Times reported on the early recall effort by “a small group of antitax crusaders 
and conservative Republicans,” and it also noted—ominously, in retrospect—that “the 
recall effort has been largely centered on drumming up support on the Internet and 
conservative talk radio shows . . . .” Dean E. Murphy, California Recall Effort Clouds 
Davis’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, at 28; see also http://www.rescuecalifornia. 
com/petitions/ (“Recall of Failed Governor Joseph Graham Davis: Petitions and 
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enforcement of so-called “traditional” property entitlements on the 
Internet is, at best, misplaced, and, at worst, dangerous to the freedom 
and creative potential of this new realm.8  Their despair in response to 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,9 the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act,10 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred v.  
Ashcroft11 is palpable.12  Siva Vaidhyanathan decries extending copyright 
Signatures Collection Succeeded—Recall Vote Succeeded”) (2004); http://www. 
recallgraydavis.com/ (recall campaign supported by former California Assemblyman 
Howard Kaloogian) (last visited Feb.  11, 2005). 
 8. See, e.g., Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyright as Cudgel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Aug. 2, 2002, at http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i47/47b00701.htm (condemning “the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act as reckless, poorly thought out, and with gravely 
censorious consequences”). 
 9. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827–2828 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302 
and 304 by extending copyrights terms, both prospectively and retroactively). 
 10. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).  The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) extended copyright protections to the Internet in two important 
ways.  First, it defined secondary liability standards for ISPs, Usenet hosts and websites 
when their services are used by copyright infringers.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512.  Second, it 
proscribed programmers from accessing digital code that was copyrighted or expressed a 
copyrighted work.  See 17 U.S.C.  § 1201. 
 11. 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act). 
 12. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, The Copyright Cage, LEGAL AFFAIRS (July–Aug. 2003), 
at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2003/feature_zittrain_julaug03.html (noting 
that the author “hate[s] the effects of copyright on a digital revolution . . . . [and] hate[s] that 
creativity is metered and parceled to its last ounce of profit”); David Post, Some Thoughts on 
Copyright Extension, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, at http://volokh.com/2003_01_19 
_volokh_archive.html (posted Jan. 19, 2003) (noting that he “was disappointed in the Court’s 
decision in Eldred v.  Ashcroft,” that the DMCA “is a disgrace,” and that “the politics of 
copyright is deeply, profoundly, screwed up”); Jack M. Balkin, Mickey in Chains, Part II, or 
Why the Court Got it Wrong in Eldred v. Ashcroft, BALKINIZATION, at http://balkin. 
blogspot.com/2003_01_12_balkin_archive.html (posted Jan. 15, 2003) (stating that Eldred “is 
simply a disastrous opinion for free speech, and the Court should be ashamed of the shoddy job 
it’s done”); Dan Gillmor, Hacking, Hijacking Our Rights, SILICONVALLEY.COM, at http://www. 
mercurynews.com/mld/siliconvalley/business/columnists/dan_gillmor/3751660.htm?1c 
(July 27, 2002) (stating that copyright forces are winning and that “[t]hese are 
discouraging times”); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 192 (2001) (noting that “the 
future is murky” and that she has become “more cynical”). 
However, recent court successes by defendants fending off plaintiffs’ copyright 
infringement claims have given Internet exceptionalists some grounds to be more 
optimistic at the close of 2004.  See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting DMCA claim raised against 
company that provided means for consumers to reuse toner cartridges); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting vicarious 
liability claims against P2P file swapping network providers, Grokster, KaZaa, and 
Morpheus), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686  (2004); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink 
Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting DMCA claim by garage door 
manufacturer against manufacturer of universal remote control); Online Policy Group v. 




terms and applying copyright to novel forms of expression in digital 
media because this is “unjustifiably locking up content that deserves to 
be free.”13  Or, as Lawrence Lessig bluntly puts it: “Ours is less and less 
a free society.”14
With growing alacrity, the Internet exceptionalists are thus attempting 
to frame the public debate solely in terms of freedom, liberty, creativity, 
our “common culture,” and the public domain.  No one seems to 
epitomize this better than the prominent tech commentator and blogger, 
Doc Searls, who lamented the Eldred decision, but came away from the 
experience having learned an important lesson: The fundamental issue in 
the policy debate is neither political nor legal, but “conceptual.”15  Searls 
realized that they lost Eldred because proponents of digital copyright—of 
copyright generally—have successfully defined their legal entitlements 
as property, which makes Searls and others who believe in the “public 
domain” and the “commons” sound like they are, well, for lack of a 
better term, “Communist.”16  Searls later wrote that they “need to figure 
a way around the Property Problem,” because “we lose in the short run 
as long as copyright (and, for that matter, patents) are perceived as 
simple property.  Our challenge is to change that.”17 Some do not even like 
the term “commons” because it “itself is a ‘property’ metaphor.”18 “[W]e 
must change the terms of the debate,”19 Vaidhyanathan has intoned, and 
thus recognize that “[c]opyright should be about policy, not property.”20
Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting DMCA claim by 
Diebold against college students who placed online information concerning potential 
problems in Diebold’s computerized voting system); see also Robert P. Merges, A New 
Dynanism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 185 (2004) (discussing the 
various private ordering mechanisms favoring the public domain that have developed in 
response to “the most egregious excesses of the [IP] system”). 
 13. Siva Vaidhyanathan, After the Copyright Smackdown: What Next?, at 
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/01/17/copyright/ (Jan. 17, 2003). 
 14. Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, O’REILLY NETWORK, at http://www.oreillynet. 
com/lpt/a/2641 (keynote presentation at the Open Source Convention, July 22, 2002).  
Lessig repeats this point in his published work, where he posits that increasing controls 
over digital technology and copyrighted works present a “constitutional question” that he 
phrases as: “Are we, in the digital age, to be a free society?”  LESSIG, supra note 2, at 11. 
 15. Doc Searls, Going Deep, at http://www.aotc.info/archives/000160.html#000160 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2003) (copy on file with author). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Doc Searls, Saving the Net: Who Owns What?, LINUX J., at http://www. 
linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6989 (July 22, 2003) (emphasis added). 
 18. Lawrence Lessig, Free the Air, at http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/ 
001248.shtml (posted May 31, 2003) (reporting on and expressing agreement with 
Yochai Benkler’s position). 
 19. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 12 (2001). 
 20. Id. at 15.  This is an omnipresent theme within Vaidhyanathan’s work.  
Elsewhere, he has written: “We make a grave mistake when we choose to engage in 
discussions of copyright in terms of ‘property.’ Copyright is not about ‘property’ as 
commonly understood.  It is a specific state-granted monopoly issued for particular 
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There are two ways in which one can interpret the Internet 
exceptionalists’ complaint about the “Property Problem” and their 
injunction that “copyright is policy, not property”: A strong sense and a 
weak sense.  Before discussing these two senses, though, a brief remark 
about the scope of this Essay is in order.  This Essay will describe how 
the property theory that Epstein explicates in Liberty versus Property 
might respond to the specific claims advanced by the Internet 
exceptionalists.  Accordingly, its purpose is not to offer a complete 
account of why digital copyright is property.  That is not possible in an 
Essay that offers only an abbreviated, descriptive account of one aspect 
of the debate, especially given the admittedly heretical nature of these 
remarks to the Internet exceptionalists and their web-surfing allies.  The 
justification of the property theory itself is in Epstein’s article, and in 
other articles already written or yet to be produced.21
In its strong sense, the Internet exceptionalists’ thesis quickly devolves 
into a truism about property rights as such.  If it is true—as it must be—that 
copyright is policy, then it is equally true that all property rights are 
policy.  In proving this point in his article, Epstein prefers utilitarian 
analysis, and he has spent much of his professional life attempting to 
show the ways in which the incremental development of property rights 
in the West represents the slow (and unending) march to identify utility-
maximizing rules for our social and political institutions.  Yet, even if 
one does not wish to jump on the utilitarian train that Epstein is calling 
us all aboard, it is easy to see that every tangible property entitlement has 
arisen from a crucible of moral, political, and economic analyses, and 
thus implicates the same questions about utility, personal dignity, and 
freedom that now dominate the debates over digital copyright.  The 
preeminent property cases that every law student studies in the first year 
of law school are exemplars of this basic truth.22
policy reasons.”  Vaidhyanathan, supra note 8. 
 21. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New 
Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803 (2001); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright 
as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); Ayn Rand, Patents and 
Copyrights, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 130–34 (1967).  See also Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (discussing, in 
part, the justificatory role of labor theories of property for intellectual property 
entitlements). 
 22. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussing 
acquisition of title to land by the European settlers from the American Indians); Pierson 
v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (addressing the requirements for claiming 
property in wild animals). 




When Internet exceptionalists thus maintain that “[c]opyright is not 
about ‘property,’ . . . [i]t is a specific state-granted monopoly issued for 
particular policy reasons,”23 then they must also maintain that no legal 
rights in any tangible things are property.  Everything that everyone 
owns—tangible or otherwise—represents only state-granted legal 
monopolies issued to individuals for particular policy reasons.  As 
Epstein rightly points out, at a fundamental level of analysis, “property 
and monopoly . . . are the same side of the same coin.”24 Accordingly, in 
this strong sense, the Internet exceptionalists’ complaint about extending 
copyright to digital media is, at the same time, neither informative nor 
instructive—unless one’s goal is to restructure universally the concepts 
and legal rules for all property entitlements in American society. 
It is unsurprising then that the Internet exceptionalists’ rhetoric has 
produced the politically charged label of Communist.  When Dan 
Gillmor publishes a webzine article attacking the Eldred decision under 
the heading, “Supreme Court Endorses Copyright Theft,” writing that 
the Supreme Court decision has sanctioned “a brazen heist,” and asking 
his readers, “Who got robbed?  You did.  I did,” one hears the rallying 
call: Copyright is theft!25 When one hears Lessig’s similar complaint 
that the Copyright Term Extension Act is a “theft of our common 
culture,”26 one hears again the rallying call: Copyright is theft! As Doc 
Searls aptly points out, it is no surprise that Gillmor’s and Lessig’s 
readers hear the echoes of the nineteenth-century socialists’ self-
described battle cry: “Property is theft!”27
We are not compelled, however, to adopt only the strong sense of the 
Internet exceptionalists’ rhetoric.  There is also a weak sense to their 
claim that copyright is policy, not property; namely, that copyright is 
fundamentally different from tangible property, and, as best illustrated in 
the context of digital media, does not deserve the same moral or legal 
status typically afforded to our more traditional property entitlements.  
This is hardly a radical claim, and there is substantial evidentiary 
support for this proposition in the American copyright and patent 
scheme.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated: The constitutional 
grant of power to Congress to protect copyrights and patents “reflects a 
balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of 
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance 
 23. Vaidhyanathan, supra note 8. 
 24. Epstein, supra note 1, at 23. 
 25. Dan Gillmor, Supreme Court Endorses Copyright Theft, SILICONVALLEY.COM, at 
http://weblog.siliconvalley.com/column/dangillmor/archives/000730.shtml (Jan. 15, 2003). 
 26. Lessig, supra note 14. 
 27. PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 13 (Donald R. Kelley & 
Bonnie G. Smith eds., trans., 1994) (1840). 
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in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”28
From such judicial and legislative statements, the Internet exceptionalists 
make an important change to Epstein’s juxtaposition.  It is not “liberty 
versus property,” but rather “liberty versus monopoly.” And, they 
conclude, the stifling effects of extending the copyright monopoly to 
digital media substantially outweigh the negligible benefit (if any) of 
promoting innovation.  Here, the Internet exceptionalists adopt the same 
utilitarian metric employed by Epstein, arguing that “[b]efore the 
[copyright] monopoly should be permitted, there must be reason to 
believe it will do some good—for society, and not just for the monopoly 
holders.”29  Reflecting his desire that we interpret the Internet 
exceptionalists’ claims in this weak sense, Lessig asks (somewhat 
rhetorically but obviously in frustration): “Does calling for balance make 
one a communist?”30
In this weak sense, therefore, the claim that “copyright is policy, not 
property,” is simply shorthand for the proposition that we must achieve 
and maintain balance in the utility calculation of “liberty vs. copyright 
monopoly.” There are two supporting premises for this proposition that 
Internet exceptionalists sometimes intermingle: The first is historical, 
and the second is analytical.  On the historical side, Internet exceptionalists 
maintain that copyrights and other intellectual property rights have 
always been viewed as monopolies issued by the state according to a 
strict utility calculus.  Again, this is not a radical claim.  Thomas 
Jefferson, an avowed defender of the natural right to property, believed 
that “[i]nventions . . . cannot, in nature, be a subject of property,” and that 
“an exclusive right” is granted to inventors by “[s]ociety” solely “as an 
 28. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that the “monopoly privileges that 
Congress may authorize” under the Constitution serve “an important public purpose” in 
“motivat[ing] the creative activity of authors and inventors”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (noting, in the context of patent law, that the Constitution precludes 
Congress from “enlarg[ing] the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, 
advancement or social benefit gained thereby”). 
 29. Lawrence Lessig, May the Source Be With You, WIRED (Dec. 2001), at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.12/lessig.html (arguing against the protection of 
software code under copyright “monopolies”). 
 30. Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Copyright, INDUSTRY STANDARD (June 19, 
2000), at http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,16071,00.html.  More recently, 
Lessig writes: “The property right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it 
was, or was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become unbalanced, 
tilted toward an extreme.”  LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 173 (2004). 




encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility . . . .”31
The historical record, however, is not as one-sided as the Internet 
exceptionalists would like us to believe.  Since the enactment of the Statute 
of Anne in 1709,32 the first modern copyright law, the justification for 
copyright has comprised two general normative theories.  The first is 
utilitarianism, and the second is natural rights theory, particularly the 
labor theory of property and the social contract doctrine at the core of 
John Locke’s political philosophy.33  The labor theory of property usually is 
given short shrift by modern copyright scholars, but it certainly played a 
justificatory role in the historical copyright debates.  As Representative 
Gulian Verplanck stated in defense of a bill that became the Copyright 
Act of 1831: “[T]he work of an author was the result of his own labor.  It 
was a right of property existing before the law of copyrights had been 
made.”34  State laws protecting intellectual property rights prior to the 
1787 Federal Convention also reflected a Lockean influence.  New 
Hampshire, to name but one example, enacted legislation to protect 
copyrights and other forms of intellectual property because “there being 
no property more peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced by 
the labour of his mind.”35  Moreover, the evolution and creation of new 
types of intellectual property rights in the nineteenth century, such as 
trademarks and trade secrets, followed the contours of a labor theory of 
property.36  The initial definition and protection of trade secrets as 
property entitlements, for instance, derived its justification from the 
courts’ belief that such rights were similar to other property rights born 
of valuable labor and already protected by the law.37
 31. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Isaac McPherson (August 13, 1813), in THE LIFE 
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 576–77 (Adrienne Koch & William 
Peden eds., 1993). 
 32. 8 Ann., c. 19 (1709) (Eng.). 
 33. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (noting the “complementary” 
relationship between the utilitarian and labor-desert theories in copyright law). 
 34. Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 
37, 40 (2002) (quoting 7 REG. DEB. 424 (1831)). 
 35. Act for Encouragement of Literature and Genius (1783), in COPYRIGHT 
ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 
8 (1973).  Massachusetts and Rhode Island adopted the exact same language in their own 
respective copyright statutes in 1783.  Id. at 4, 9; see also Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor 
Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 164 (2002) (explaining how New Hampshire’s 
Act for the Encouragement of Literature reflected a Lockean proposition that was of 
normative import to Americans in the late eighteenth century). 
 36. See Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 415–24 (2003) (discussing the genesis in the nineteenth century of 
trade secret and trademark rights as intellectual property doctrines). 
 37. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass.  452, 457–58 (1868) (protecting trade 
secrets as nonexclusive intellectual property rights because of their similarity to “good 
will,” which is protected by the law when a “man establishes a business and makes it 
valuable by his skill and attention”). 
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It is a profound oversimplification to declare that intellectual property 
rights, including copyright, have always been conceived solely as 
“monopolies” doled out by the state according to a utilitarian calculus 
that weighs social and scientific progress against the stifling effects and 
deadweight losses attributable to typical government-created monopolies.  
The proposition that “copyright is a property right” is not a novel form 
of political rhetoric invented by Jack Valenti sometime in the last twenty 
years in order to advance the interests of Hollywood before Congress.38  
In casting the history of intellectual property rights in this way, an 
interesting and multifaceted historical record is flattened out in order to 
create a picture of what the Internet exceptionalists believe copyright 
and other intellectual property rights should be today.  As one critic has 
noted, this is not history, but rather the construction of a myth.39
Why the Internet exceptionalists retell the history of intellectual 
property rights in this way reflects their underlying conception of the 
nature of these rights.  As noted earlier, they believe that intellectual 
property rights generally are merely monopolies.  In other words, 
copyrights and patents comprise only monopoly privileges handed out to 
authors and inventors by Congress under the constitutional grant of 
authority to Congress that it “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”40  This is the analytical side of the weak interpretation of 
“copyright is policy, not property,” and, once again, this is hardly a 
radical claim, as reflected in the contemporary Supreme Court’s repeated 
references to copyright and patent rights as “monopolies.”41
 38. Valenti was President and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America.  
See Frank Field, FURDLOG, at http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/index.php?wl_mode=more& 
wl_eid=310 (last updated June 12, 2003) (criticizing the claim that copyright is property 
as merely a modern “political agenda”); see also Gillmor, supra note 5 (offering a 
similar criticism of “intellectual property” as merely a self-interested political ploy by 
the modern “copyright industry”). 
These criticisms are factually inaccurate.  Copyrights were identified as “property” in 
state statutes in the early 1780s.  See supra note 35.  In 1824, Daniel Webster proposed 
patent legislation in the House of Representatives, declaring in his floor speech that “he 
need not argue that the right of the inventor is a high property; it is the fruit of his 
mind—it belongs to him more than any other property . . . and he ought to be protected 
in the enjoyment of it.”  41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824).  Patents were later identified 
as “industrial property,” a precursor to “intellectual property,” in the Paris Convention of 
1883, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate and signed by President Grover Cleveland in 
1887.  See Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 25 Stat. 1372 (1883). 
 39. See generally Nachbar, supra note 34. 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 41. See supra note 28 (citing cases). 




This definition of intellectual property solely in terms of a utility-
based monopoly, as opposed to a type of property, is actually the result 
of an impoverished concept of property that has dominated our political 
discourse in the twentieth century.  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
legal scholars and judges redefined “property” as a set of “social 
relations”42—what later became known as a “bundle” of rights.43  With 
this narrow focus on the purely social role of property, it was but a short 
step to focus on the one social right in the bundle of rights that 
constitutes our modern understanding of property: The right to exclude.  
In fact, the Supreme Court would eventually declare that the right to 
exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that 
are commonly characterized as property.”44  As one prominent property 
scholar put it recently, the right to exclude is the sine qua non of a 
property right.45
This narrow definition of property as the right to exclude works well 
for tangible property entitlements, but it fails miserably to capture our 
intangible property entitlements.  In the world of tangible property, there 
are fences and boundary lines that physically exclude non-owners.  
There is also ontological exclusivity: Two people cannot occupy the 
same piece of land at the same time but in different ways.  Two farmers 
who each attempted to till the same piece of soil—one trying to grow 
corn and the other wheat—would soon come to blows as to who may do 
what with the land.46  Accordingly, the fact of physical exclusion serves 
as an objective baseline for defining the right to exclude. 
For intellectual property rights, the problem with reducing property to 
the right to exclude is readily apparent.  There is no natural exclusion of 
intellectual property entitlements.  Inventions, books, and computer code 
can be copied willy-nilly without taking the original physical product 
away from the inventor or author.  (In the economist’s terms, intellectual 
property is a “public good” given its nonrivalrous and nonexhaustive 
characteristics.)47  Unlike that one acre of land over which the two 
farmers are pummeling each other, the P2P file swapper can trade music 
 42. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 361–
63 (1954). 
 43. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
 44. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
 45. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 
730 (1998). 
 46. As one natural rights theorist succinctly put it: A conflict over goods “shows 
the falsity of the old saying: ‘Mine and thine are the causes of all wars.’ Rather it is that 
‘mine and thine’ were introduced to avoid wars.” SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE 
NATURAE ET GENTIUM 541 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688) (the 
title translates as On the Law of Nature and Nations). 
 47. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 62–63 (3d ed. 2004). 
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files without impinging on the original author’s right to listen to his own 
song or on another person’s right to listen to the copy that he rightfully 
has purchased.  The right to exclude in intellectual property entitlements 
exists by legal fiat.  It is solely a creation of the law with no natural 
counterpart in the actual facts of how people interact in the world.  Thus, 
the exclusive rights granted to copyright and patent holders appear 
arbitrary—they are only legal figments of our collective social imagination.  
And these rights certainly do not fit the definition of property, which, as 
we are constantly reminded, is naturally exclusive. 
When one throws into this policy mix the unique characteristics of 
digital technology, especially the Internet, it becomes clear that intellectual 
property “monopolies” should be restrained in our new digital world.  
There is no natural exclusion in the digital domain, and the creation of 
“artificial” barriers simply restricts free movement and stifles decision-
making.  Even if there were some type of objective baseline justifying 
exclusive copyright entitlements before the invention of the Internet, 
there certainly is none now.  The P2P users of Napster (before its 
reincarnation as a pay-per-download MP3 service), and now Morpheus and 
KaZaa, cheaply and easily copy files from one to another with nothing 
stopping them except their bandwidth allotment and the storage capacity 
on their hard drives—or the cease and desist letter from the Recording 
Industry Association of America.  While bandwidth restrictions are 
somehow real to the P2P user, the cease and desist letter is not.  And this 
makes sense only because people define “property” today solely in terms 
of exclusion.  Doc Searls is correct: The problem is conceptual, but the 
real problem is that we are defining property in such a way that 
copyright and other intellectual property entitlements cannot be anything 
other than artificial monopolies, enforced at the policy whim of 
Congress. 
It is at this fundamental level of analysis that Epstein’s article is most 
insightful.  He reveals that the analytical framework that explains how 
physical property rights have been defined applies equally to intellectual 
property rights; the difference between the two types of property rights 
is not a difference in kind, but only one of degree.48  As with chattels or 
fishing rights, when one is faced with a different context, one must 
 48. See also Solveig Singleton, IP as Conflict Resolution: A Micro View of IP, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 45, 48 (2005) (noting from a utilitarian perspective that the differing 
incentives between “physical property and IP” are “not a difference of kind but of 
degree”). 




define one’s property rules accordingly.  The legal rules that make sense 
for dividing up and using farmland should not be applied deductively to 
fish or wild game, or vice-versa.  This does not mean that these rights are 
not property rights.  It means that they are only a different type of 
property right—but a property right nonetheless.  To put it bluntly, if not 
in an oversimplified way, digital copyright is to the author and computer 
programmer today what fishing rights were to the whalers and fishermen 
of yesteryear.49
Although Epstein prefers to recast natural rights theory in solely 
consequentialist terms, there is a significant and substantive element of 
the theory, particularly the Lockean version preferred by Epstein, which 
is not fully captured in this retelling.  The preeminent natural rights 
theorists—Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke—worked 
with a concept of property whose roots went far back into the Western 
canon, to the ancient Greek philosophers and the Roman lawyers.50  The 
principal focus of this tradition was the exact opposite of our 
contemporary view of property: They were concerned not only with how 
property functioned in complex social and economic relationships, but 
how property arose in the first place, and what this told us about the 
nature of property as such.51  This explains the focus of these theorists 
on the analytical fulcrum creating property entitlements: The acquisition, 
labor or creative work that brings something into human possession and 
use.52  And this provenance informed the natural rights theorists that the 
core or substance of property is the action that one takes to create and 
maintain the property.53  Thus, the classic definition of property as the 
right to use, possess and dispose of one’s possessions.54
 49. See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (discussing rules for resolving two 
fishermen’s competing property claims to a whale); see also JAMES M. ACHESON, THE 
LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) (discussing, in part, how lobstermen have created a 
system of property rights without reference to the legal system). 
 50. See generally Mossoff, supra note 36, at 377–95 (discussing the “integrated 
theory of property” advanced by Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke, and the dominance of 
this theory of property within the Western canon). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. William Blackstone writes: 
   Property, both in lands and moveables, being thus originally acquired by 
the first taker, which taking amounts to a declaration that he intends to 
appropriate the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by the principles of 
universal law, till such time as he does some other act which shows an 
intention to abandon it . . . . 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *9 (emphases added). 
 54. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 39 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1954) (350 
B.C.E.) (stating that a thing “is ‘our own’ if it is in our power to dispose of it or keep it”).  
In 1625, Grotius approvingly translated Aristotle’s definition as: “The definition of 
ownership . . . is to have within one’s power the right to alienation.”  HUGO GROTIUS, DE 
JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 260 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625) (the title 
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This concept of property dominated the American understanding of 
property in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  It is revealed in the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court’s explanation in 1872 that “[i]n a strict 
legal sense, land is not ‘property,’ but the subject of property.  The term 
‘property,’ . . . in its legal signification . . . ‘is the right of any person to 
possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing.’”55  Or, as James Madison 
wrote in 1792, “property” means more than just “land, or merchandise, 
or money,” this concept has a “larger and juster meaning, [as] it 
embraces everything to which a man may attach a value and have a 
right.”56  Property is the right to acquire, use, and dispose of the things 
that one has created through one’s labor.  It is this concept of property 
that precipitated the virtual truism in American society that every person 
has a right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labors. 
It is also this concept of property—which focuses on the substantive 
relationship between a person and the thing that he has labored upon or 
created—that explains and justifies the protection of intellectual property 
rights, regardless whether these rights exist in tangible books or computer 
code.  A person’s right to control the disposition of his creation, and 
thereby enjoy the fruits—the profit—of his labors, is central to the legal 
definition and protection of property entitlements.57  As the New York 
Court of Appeals stated in 1856: “Property is the right of any person to 
possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing. . . .  A man may be deprived 
of his property in a chattel, therefore, without its being seized or 
physically destroyed, or taken from his possession.”58  In the context of 
tangible property rights, the courts have never demanded that a person 
be deprived physically of his property as a necessary prerequisite for 
finding a violation of property rights.  Stealing the fruits of one’s labors 
or indirectly interfering with the use of the property is sufficient; in other 
translates as The Law of War and Peace).  In agreement with the Roman law, Pufendorf 
characterizes property as the right to “use, abuse and destroy [a possession] at our 
pleasure.” SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO 
NATURAL LAW 130 (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., 1991) (1673). 
 55. Eaton v. B. C. & M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872). 
 56. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in THE 
MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 186 
(Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981). 
 57. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding, in part, that a man has a property right in his sperm because he has “decision 
making authority as to the use of his sperm for reproduction,” and this control over its 
use and disposition is an “interest [that] is sufficient to constitute ‘property’”). 
 58. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (1856) (emphases added). 




words, it is sufficient that one lose the ability to use, control or dispose 
of the values that one has created.59  It is this concept of property that 
explains why copyright is in fact property, rather than monopoly 
privileges meted out to authors at the leisure of the state’s utility 
calculation. 
As opposed to the excessively narrow definition of property today, the 
concept of property at work in natural rights theory is sufficient in 
breadth and scope to explain and justify myriad property entitlements in 
a variety of contexts—tangible and intangible.  As noted earlier, it 
served as the analytical baseline for defining and protecting the new 
types of valuable intellectual property that arose during the industrial 
revolution, such as trademarks and trade secrets.60  In the context of 
copyright, it was unclear at the turn of the century how our legal rules 
would apply to the amazing new inventions of the day, such as 
phonorecords and player pianos.61  Several decades later, the legal rules 
of copyright faced another revolution with the invention of radio and 
television.62  With each inventive leap forward, the legal protections 
evolve as well, because the author deserves to control the use and 
disposition of his property. 
The past evolution of copyright law is notable because we are in the 
midst of another revolution today—the digital revolution.  The impact of 
the digital revolution is as far reaching as was the industrial revolution 
of the nineteenth century, but it is important to realize that we are still in 
the midst of this revolution.  It is not yet clear how and in what ways 
intellectual property rights should be best protected in the new digital 
domain, but the evolution of intellectual property rights is as necessary 
today as it was during the industrial revolution.  It would be wrong to 
condemn outright our early attempts to define copyright entitlements for 
digital content, just as it would have been wrong to condemn the early 
attempts at defining trademarks or the evolving rules of copyright at the 
 59. Nuisance doctrine is a long-standing example of this basic principle in 
property law.  As opposed to trespass, which requires a physical entry on a person’s 
property, nuisance requires only that there be a “substantial and unreasonable” 
interference with “the use and enjoyment” of one’s property.  W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 13, at 70 (5th ed. 1984). 
 60. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 61. In 1908, the Supreme Court held that piano rolls used in mechanized piano 
players were not copies of the music, because the rolls were not literal reproductions of 
the written musical score that could be read by another person.  See White-Smith Music 
Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).  In 1909, Congress responded to White-
Smith by extending copyright protection to phonorecords.  See H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 9 
(1909).  The exclusive right to control the reproduction of copies of copyrighted works in 
“phonorecords” is retained in the 1976 Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1995). 
 62. Copyright owners have the right to control public performances and reproductions 
in “motion pictures” and “other audiovisual works.”  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)–(5). 
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end of the nineteenth century.  A legal doctrine in transition may be 
criticized for its various fits and starts, but the difficulties inherent in the 






























 63. One online petition drafted by Lawrence Lessig, and which is no longer 
accessible, called for Congress to roll back copyright protections to those set forth more 
than two hundred years ago in the first copyright act of 1790.  See Reclaim Copyright Law 
Petition to United States Congress, at http://www.petitiononline.com/progress/petition.html 
(last visited June 4, 2003) (copy on file with author).  In Free Culture, Lessig emphasizes his 
point about the extremity of the copyright laws today by comparing them to the 
protections secured under the 1790 copyright act.  LESSIG, supra note 30, at 130–39 & 
170–73. 
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